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FAITH, SCEPTICISM AND AGNOSTICISM
An analysis of Professor Paul Elmer [Nlore's The Sccpiical
Approach to Religion
BY VICTOR S. YARROS
The Agnostic, it is safe to say, reads very few books on Religion.
He knows that he will find nothing new, important, or thought-
provoking in such books, and he believes, with Thomas H. Huxley,
that certain questions are settled and closed and that the principle
of open-mindedness does not require us periodically to reopen such
questions in the absence of new evidence of sufficient weight and
intellectual gravity which honest thinkers cannot possibly ignore.
Since the death of the great Agnostics—Huxley. Tyndall,
Spencer, to name no others—nothing has been said either by theolo-
gians or metaphysicians and philosophers that has tended, in the
smallest degree, to oppress or impress the intelligent and cultivated
adherents of the school they founded. The growth of Agnosticism
is, of course, a salient and significant fact of the times. But the Ag-
nostic will do well to make an exception of one very recent and rather
small book on religion—namely. Professor Paul Elmer More'a
The Sceptical Approacli to Religion. Here is a work which, by its
candor, apparent reasonableness, appeal to alleged fact and universal
experience, and keen logic, challenges the attention of the confirmed
Agnostic and leads him to search his soul and to put certain serious
questions to his trained and disciplined mind.
Professor ]\Iore has great respect for the genuine sceptic and
endeavors to convince him without question-begging and, as he
claims, without departing from the truly scientific method of in-
vestigation and argumentation. The sceptic, if he is consistent,
courageous, and adventurous, thinks Professor ]\Iore, should and
must accept Faith or Religion.
This, clearly, is a remarkable affirmation, and it will be both
profitable and enjoyable to examine it with some thoroughness.
But first let us note Professor More's definition and characteriza-
tion of the sceptic. ^lany, he avers, who probably imagine them-
selves to be sceptics, are nothing of that sort. They are merely
indifferent, timid, mentally indolent, superficial in dealing with
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great problems. Such persons Professor More leaves out of his
reckoning, for, as he says, he simply does not understand them.
They have no curiosity in respect of the cosmos, of human destiny,
of the meaning of life, and seem to him to be deficient in that essen-
tial quality which distinguishes man as man. They may be estimable,
gifted, eminent, useful, but they are not fully or truly human.
The sceptic, says Professor More, is one whose faculties are alert,
who is bound to feel the force of the dilemma which confronts the
sensitive, earnest, truth-seeking man, and who does not ignore the
claims and challenge of Religion, but has to find a good and valid
reason for remaining a sceptic.
The sceptic, therefore, must and does make a choice between two
clear, definite, intellectually respectable positions. To quote Prof.
More:
Looking at religion from the outside, he will say that the
whole range of beliefs can be explained as pure undemonstrable
inference . . . not an inference from what is outwardly ob-
served or from the mechanism of reason, but a projection into
the void, so to speak, of his own feeling of personal freedom,
responsibility and purpose.
And the sceptic will go a step further. Perceiving that
Christianity alone of religions corresponds with the final data of
self-knowledge, he will say that the hard real duel lies between
frank materialistic mechanism and the historic teleology of the
Logos doctrine to which the Platonic philosophy may be re-
garded as a sort of preparation.
We shall return to this question of choice. But first we must
show just how Professor More, in his gentle efifort to convert the
sceptic, arrives at his basic conclusion— his religion or his faith.
He recognizes the necessity of a firm and solid starting point—of
"some element of consciousness which is universal to all men and
cannot be honestly disputed."
That element, according to him, is found in the sense of self-
approval or self-reproach which we feel as we act in one way or
another. We know, in other words, by an "intuitive afifection" that
some acts are right and others wrong. The sense we call moral
—
our conscience—is an integral part of our constitution as human
beings. Moreover, it is more than a present feeling ; it embraces
the future, and is, therefore, teleological. It implies a purpose, a
pattern, a way of life, and any serious departure from our purpose
brings regret, remorse, a sense of sin, of unworthiness.
FAITH, SCEPTICISM AND AGNOSTICISM 57
Further, these feelings and this teleology of conscience are uni-
versal. Xo human being is without them. No human being lives
without some standard of conduct, or escapes remorse if he com-
mits an act at variance with his code of right and wrong.
So much, of course, the sceptic will concede without hesitation.
The next step, however, is bound to raise doubts and misgivings.
The data of observation, affirms Professor More, appear to con-
tradict the data of human intuition. There are no signs of purpose
in the universe. The natural world, including man, seems to be
a series of mechanical actions and reactions. Science, as Spinoza
pointed out, is resolutely non-teleological. Which, then, is the illu-
sion, the voice of conscience, or the verdict of observation?
Rationalism takes the view that our inward sense of freedom and
responsibility is illusory, and that science is the only possible guide
of human action, while religion, without repudiating science within
a certain wnde practical realm, urges us to trust our conscience, defy
the logic of observation, and carry over the sense of freedom, re-
sponsibility, and purpose into our interpretation of the cosmos.
'To faith the whole world thus becomes teleological, and religion
is an attempt to live in harmony with a world so conceived."
The sceptic, then, is invited by Professor More to obey the urge
in question and accept faith, with the obligation to live in harmony
with the dictates of religion. He is bold enough to suggest, indeed,
that those sceptics who choose rationalism and reject cosmic teleology
do so, perhaps, because they shrink from the obligations of a
religious life.
It is unfortunate, by the way, that Professor More refrains from
elucidating his conception of the obligations of faith. Had he done
this, he would have encountered a great difficulty—namely, that,
in the first place, many sceptics and Agnostics do live up to the man-
dates of what he calls faith, and, in the second place, that millions
of men and w-omen who call themselves religious do not live up to
those mandates.
How does he explain the case of those who observe the obliga-
tions of the religious life, socially and morally, while clinging to
rationalism? He cannot accuse tJiese of indolence, of timidity, of
love of ease, of selfishness, of fear of adventure and risk. He must
face the embarrassing fact that these men and women simply do not
feel the urge to carry over their intuitive afifection, their sense of
right and wrong, of freedom, into their interpretation of the cosmos.
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Professor ]\Iore truly says that all human beings have standards
of conduct, and at times a sense of sin and remorse, but it is obvi-
ously not true that all human beings feel the urge to accept faith or
religion and thus attribute purpose to the cosmos.
True, as Professor More asserts, there is significance in the
fact of the universality of religion. But what of the universality of
superstition? And what of the grosser superstitions even in the
relatively advanced religious systems? What do these facts prove?
It was doubtless a mistake for Spencer or for others to suppose
that some one cause—dreams, for example, or the appearance of
ghosts, or the trials and burdens of life on earth
—
produced religion.
Many causes must have combined to develop the several religious
systems, with the belief in a sort of personal immortality, in a
heaven, in a personal creator interested particularly in the down-
trodden and disinherited.
The only question which demands the attention of educated per-
sons concerns the validity and the reasonableness of the essential
affirmations of the two or three religions recognized as advanced
and free from the most puerile and absurd superstitions. Professor
More accepts Christianity, including the dogma of incarnation. He
even asserts that Christianity has said the last word on the subject
of God, human destinity, salvation, and redemption, and that no
further evolution is possible in fundamental religious thought.
But in making these claims he chooses to ignore the fact that
Agnosticism as one form of scepticism is becoming all but universal
among educated and cultivated men. The Agnostics do not feel
the urge to accept any faith, and least of all the dogma of incarnation
and redemption. They cannot make the leap involved in acceptance
of the idea that God condescended "to enter personally into his
creation and to be born as man among men." They can form no
image or idea of God ; they cannot believe that Jesus of Nazareth
was "the son of God"; they cannot believe that Jesus died to save
the human race, or that that race is saved in any sense of the word.
The Agnostic says : I simply cannot pretend to believe the state-
ments [attributed to Jesus] on which Christianity is based, and if
he made them, he was misinterpreting mental and physical phenomena
which the science of his day did little to elucidate.
Jesus, to the Agnostic, as to many others, was a prophet and
reformer who used the language of other Hebrew prophets, but
who offended the great majority of the Jews by his "blasphemy"
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and who aroused the suspicions and fears of the Roman authorities
hy his activities as preacher and agitator, since some of his fol-
lowers believed that he would restore David's regime.
As to the assertion regarding God, the creator of the world, or
the divine purpose in this creation, or the special mission of the
human race, the Agnostic says, I do not know and cannot possibU'
know. I am under no compulsion to make the choice between
mechanism, necessitarianism, or materialism, and "faith," in the
Christian significance of that term. I humbly plead total inability to
solve the great mystery of the universe and of life, and the explana-
tions offered by the religions of the world strike me as na'ive and
childish. Faith, you tell me, is the great adventure, but, while I love
adventure, I cannot embark upon any enterprise which my reason
and my knowledge of history condemn. Without adventure, civiliza-
tion declines and perishes, you insist. \'ery well, let us undertake
the eradication of injustice and wrong in human society, establish
peace and good will, and make life worth living. Here, surely, is
adventure enough
!
But, Professor ]\Iore may ask, to what do you attribute your
"instinctive afifection" of freedom and responsibilty, and your in-
escapable sense of sin if you commit a deed you know to be wrong?
Are you willing to plead total ignorance of that, too, and rest content?
No. The Agnostic has some theories that tentatively answer
these questions. In the first place, the sense of freedom is often
illusory, the result of a mere confusion of wishes, plans, and motives.
Upon analysis, it turns out in many cases that there is no freedom at
all. Pending search and analysis, we imagine we are free to act.
For example, one may feel free to defraud somebody and to
congratulate oneself upon resisting the temptation. But what will
analysis disclose ? The resistance to the particular temptation is
often the result of fear—fear of detection, punishment, disgrace—
and of a much heavier eventual loss than the gain promised by the
fraud. It may be in part the result of education, habit, and environ-
ment.
One may feel free to take an expensive vacation and withhold aid
from needy and deserving relatives or friends. But, upon analysis,
one finds that he is not really free to take that course. The neglected
relatives and friends will suft'er, write pitiful and pathetic letters,
which will be painful to read. To escape that pain, one renounces the
pleasure of the expensive vacation.
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Where, in the end, the strongest motive prevails, or the deepest
wish, there is no freedom of action. The word freedom in this
connection is meaningless. We are bundles of desires, passions,
aspirations, ambitions, apprehensions. We love, we hate, we please
others by pleasing ourselves, and please ourselves by pleasing others.
We are social animals, members of an organic whole. Yet our
socialization is a recent achievement, and our altruism is not fully
developed. Our lives betray our origin and the heritage we are but
slowly modifying.
Agnotisticism does not undermine social morality, and human
sympathy and benevolence need no supernatural sanctions.
To return to the social and moral obligations imposed, as Pro-
fessor More tells us, by religion. What are these obligations? He
gives no specifications, but in speaking of morality he says : *T see
not where we are to look for principles of conduct more funda-
mental than the purity and humility and love exemplified in the life
of Jesus." We infer, then, that Christianity imposes upon men the
obligations of purity, humility, and love. Let us examine these obliga-
tions.
What is meant by purity? Purity of what? Of motive, doubt-
less. It cannot mean absolute chastity, or racial suicide. But what
is meant by pure motives? Obviously, disinterested, unselfish
motives. In other words, altruism. But absolute altruism, as Spencer
has shown, is an utter impossibility. We must love ourselves at
least as much as our neighbors and fellow-men. Besides, you can-
not love others merely because you are commanded to love them.
Love is an emotion, and we cannot force ourselves to experience that
emotion toward those who repel us or leave us indifferent. We love
but few, though we may like a good many.
Modern thinkers, therefore, rightly hold that by love Jesus meant
practical helpfulness, friendliness, cooperation. All religious and
moral systems not based on denial of life teach and enjoin these
primary virtues. Society cannot exist without them. Hate, anti-
pathy, division, isolation spell the end of civilization. Christianity
has no monopoly of the primary virtues, and never had.
What is meant by humility? Not false modesty, not willful
blindness to one's intellectual and moral qualities. Genius and
talent are facts. He who has them, has them, and should make
the best use of them. Jesus did. Other great men did, and we do
not accuse them of want of humility. Of course, false pride.
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arrogance, snobishness, conceit are vices. What moral system lauds
or encourages these vices? None.
Professor More's phrase is rhetorical and empty. No sceptic or
Agnostic shrinks from the obligations he mentions, in so far as they
have any significance or any application to the problems of social
life.
What obligations does Christianity impose upon the modern
employer, the modern banker, the modern broker, the modern pro-
fessional man, the modern farmer, modern wage-worker? Is
capitalism Christian; is fascism, or communism, or individualism?
We know that there are sincere Christians who believe in capitalism
and equally sincere Christians who believe in collectivism of one
type or another. Revelation, so-called, is silent on these burning
questions, and finite, limited, groping mortals are confused and
divided. Jesus will not solve the problem, since he has to be in-
terpreted, and the interpreters cannot agree, and never will.
The God hypothesis is equally useless to us in our crisis. What
happens, happens. Either God is indifferent to human affairs, or
else he has ends we cannot possibly grasp or even dimly understand.
The German followers of Hitler who repudiate Jesus, because he
was a Jew, and the gospels, because they were written by Jews, and
Christianity, because it cannot rationally be divorced from Judaism,
profess to believe in God, or gods, but are plainly reverting to
paganism. Is their movement "providential"? or is it contrary to
the intents and aims of the Christian God, and of the mission of
Jesus?
These questions are not flippant. They are answered, as we
know, in accordance with one's reading of history, including the
history of religion, and one's philosophy of life. Revelation, alas,
does not reveal anything to those who cannot accept the idea of
revelation, to begin with, and who see that the alleged revelations
can be, and are, interpreted in all manner of ways, so that, in the end,
the revelations merely indorse and sanction the notions, the
prejudices and the wishes one brought to the consideration of the
whole subject of faith and religion.
No, Professor More is not likely to win a single Agnostic to
his conclusions. His approach to religion is a mystic's approach,
after all, and not a sceptic's. It is clear that Professor More, despite
the best intention, cannot put himself in the sceptic's place and reason
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as the logical sceptic, or Agnostic, does. One final illustration of
this statement must suffice.
Professor More says : "All things considered, the so-called dis-
belief of the infidel is an influence which, if honestly examined, de-
mands an act of almost impossible credulity." And again addressing
the sceptic, he says : "You ask me to believe that nature has planted
in me, and not in me alone, but in all men, desires which I must
eradicate as pure deceptions ; that I am the victim of a cosmic jest,
only the more cruel if unintended ; that the ultimate fact of exist-
ence is a malignant mockery."
Now, does this describe the position of the Agnostic? Far from
it. The Agnostic, believes, first, that as to things which science
cannot explain he must suspend judgment, and wait with patience
for the results of further study and research, and, second, that cer-
tain things appear to be unknowable to us, and that speculation con-
cerning them is idle and futile. This position demands no act of
impossible incredulity. On the contrary, it is dictated by the hardest
of common sense as well as by the spirit of science. As to cosmic
jests and implanted wishes that the "infidel" asks us to uproot and
forget, what, pray, are they? The desire to live forever? There is
no proof that nature has implanted any such desire. It is implanted
by early education, not by nature. Nature implants a will to live,
but animals have this will as well as men. Are animals victims
of cosmic jest? Besides, thousands of men are conscious of no de-
sire for immortality. They cannot even imagine immortality.
The Agnostic knows that he does not know, and he is reconciled.
The man of faith "hopes," Professor More says, but he does not
really know what it is he hopes for. He hopes that life has a mean-
ing ; that the cosmos has a purpose, and that the purpose is good,
but, after all, these terms are used by him without meaning. He
cannot form any conception of a cosmic purpose, and he cannot
tell you what "good" means to the cosmos, since it is a purely human
conception and it relates solely to human affairs. He is not better
ofif than the Agnostic. He merely deludes himself and thinks he
thinks, to use Spencer's phrase, or believes he believes.
The sceptical approach to religion leads to scepticism, to Ag-
nosticism, not to faith.
